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Judicial Independence and the Company Law 
in the Shanghai Courts 
Nicholas Calcina Howson 
The essence of corporate and commercial laws is to protect business and commerce from the 
threat of political power. 
- Zheng Guanying (1893)' 
This chapter draws on a detailed study of corporate law adjudication in Shang-
hai from 1992 to zooS. The purpose of the study was to better understand the 
demonstrated technical competence, institutional autonomy, and political inde-
pendence of one court system in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") in a 
sector outside of the criminal law. The study consisted of a detailed examination 
and comparison of full-length corporate law opinions for more than zoo reported 
cases, a 2003 Shanghai High Court opinion on the 1994 Company Law ( describ-
ing a decade of corporate case outcomes),2 a 2007 report on cases implementing 
the Company Law in zoo6 (more than 760 cases),3 and extensive interactions with 
Shanghai court officials hand] ing such disputes4- all for a wide diversity of Shanghai 
' Li Yu, Wan qing gongsi zhidu jianshen yanjiu [Development of the Corporation System in the Late 
Qing], (Beijing: The People's Press, 2002), p. 100. 
2 Reviewing cases from the previous decade (1993-2003), see Shanghai High Courted., Gongsifa yinan 
wenti jiexi (di san ban) [Company Law Issues: Problems and Analysis (3rd Edition)], (Beijing: Law 
Press China, 2oo6), pp. 231-236 ("Shanghai Company Law Opinion"). 
l Shanghai High Court No.2 Civil Division ed., "Shanghai fayuan xin 'gongsifa' shishi yi zhounian sifa 
diaocha" ["Judiciallnvestigation of Application of the New 'Company Law' in the Shanghai Courts 
After One Year"] in Gongsi falu pinglun (2007 nianjuan) [Company Law Review (zoo7)], pp. 38-51 
("Shanghai Company Law Report"). 
4 Corporate law cases heard in the Shanghai courts vary. In 2oo6, Shanghai courts heard 768 corporate 
law-related cases. The three claims addressed most often and accounting for 76 percent of the total 
were: (i) shareholders rights (241 cases, or 31 percent of the total); (ii) share transfers (261 cases, or 
34 percent of the total); and (iii) information rights (81 cases, or 11 percent of the total). Among the 
remaining 24 percent, the Shanghai courts heard suits involving: dividend distributions, distribution of 
residual assets on liquidation, shareholder qualification, share inheritance, and- in a direct response 
to changes in the 2oo6 Company Law- shareholder applications for corporate dissolution, invalidation 
of shareholders' resolutions, and challenges to "illegally" convened shareholders' general meetings. 
134 
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jurisdictions' and procedural postures.6 Due to space limitations, this chapter focuses 
on the demonstrated independence, and to a lesser extent autonomy, of the Shanghai 
courts when faced with a completely altered Company Law. 
THE NEW JUSTICIABILITY OF THE COMPANY LAW 
Corporate law theory holds that in jurisdictions like the PRC, where the judiciary is 
regarded as underdeveloped, buffeted by political and other external pressures, and 
deficient in handling complex cases, company law must be largely self-enforcing and 
may not be structured to "depend on fast and reliable judicial decisions."7 China's 
first post-1949 company law, effective in 1994,8 was a textbook expression of this 
The High Court acknowledged that the Shanghai courts took relatively few cases involving corporate 
management rights and obligations -breach of corporate fiduciary duties -because of the relative 
complexity involved. The totality of the cases reviewed for the 1992-2008 period reveal much the same 
case composition (December 2oo8, Chief Judge of the Shanghai High Court No. 2 Civil Division; 
Shanghai Company Law Report, pp. 39-51; and Shanghai Company Law Opinion, pp. 231-236.) 
The courts include every district in Shanghai, from the expected Pudong New District (situs of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange) to far offBaoshan, and even special courts like the Shanghai Rail Transport 
intermediate court. In many cases, the Shanghai courts are forced to deal with competing proceedings 
and/or prior rulings from other jurisdictions, especially courts in the Yangtze River Delta. 
The procedural postures are consistent. Most start at the district level, whence they are subject to 
appeal (to the intermediate level) at the litigants' initiative. Less frequently they begin in intermediate 
court, with appeal to the Shanghai High Court. In only one example in the sample does the case 
reach the Supreme People's Court. Many of the case opinions indicate seemingly endless rehearings, 
often by the same court level (but by different panels of judicial officers). For instance, one case shows 
a dispute heard twice by the district court, an appeal to the intermediate court, remand to the original 
district level, and then appeal again to the higher intermediate court. The Chinese courts do not hold 
to the fact-law distinction between trial and appellate courts known in the United States, England, and 
many non-Chinese jurisdictions. Accordingly, PRC appellate proceedings allow de novo pleadings 
of law and fact. Yet in the many cases reviewed for the study, very few show reversal at the second 
level of adjudication. Certainly higher level courts demonstrate how free they are to undertake factual 
investigations de novo and often apply different law and/or remedies, but the final judgments rarely 
change. That being said, the proportion of reversals or differentiated judgments seems higher in 
corporate and commercial cases when compared to criminal prosecutions or criminal appeals. For 
just 2oo6. the Shanghai High Court reported the following with respect to corporate law cases: among 
first hearing cases, 55 percent gave rise to judgment, 11 percent were concluded through mediation, 
and 33 percent were subject to some kind of order; for cases subject to rehearing and/or appeal, 
judgments were issued in 43 percent of the cases, only 1 percent were resolved through mediation, 
and a much larger proportion- 55 percent- snbject to court order. In its report, the Shanghai High 
Court asserts that the higher percentage of cases concluded by court order on rehearing/appeal is a 
result of settlement reached between the parties or the litigants withdrawing the case. This is rather 
unsurprising, as many Chinese litigants would probably work to settlement once they have under-
stood- via the results of the first proceeding- how their claims will fare on appeal. The phenomenon 
is also an indication of the relatively low success rate of appeals in overturning the initial court's 
decision. See Shanghai Company Law Report. 
Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, "A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law," Harvard Law 
Review, vol. 109, p. 1914 (1996). 
Adopted December 29, 1993, and with minor amendments on December 25, 1999, and August z8, 
2004-
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self-enforcing model. There is little in the 1994 statute inviting judicial participation 
in corporate disputes, whether for external actors (e.g., veil-piercing) or internal par-
ticipants (e.g., fiduciary duties). The 1994law's self-enforcing character was deemed 
entirely appropriate given common perceptions of PRC judicial institutions and 
the resource constraints of its more competent but overworked securities regu-
lator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") or the public prose-
cutor, the People's Procurate. 
Notwithstanding continued real and perceived shortcomings of the judiciary, on 
October 27, 2005, the PRC's national legislature passed a wholesale reworking of the 
1994 Company Law, effective January 1, 2oo6 (the "2oo6 Company Law"). In a head-
spinning departure from the self-enforcing model of corporate law and governance, 
the Company Law was suddenly replete with broad invitations for sophisticated judi-
cial involvement, including derivative lawsuits, invalidation of corporate resolutions, 
ex post application of corporate fiduciary duties, information rights, appraisal rights, 
a right for shareholders of companies limited by shares to sue senior management 
for any breach of law, regulation, or the company articles of association, and cor-
porate veil-piercing. Even mainstream PRC corporate law scholars saw in the 2006 
Company Law a robust invitation to judicial involvement, divining for instance a 
private right of action to enforce corporate social responsibility standards or check 
the degree of Communist Party involvement in company management.9 
CORPORATE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: AUTONOMY 
AND INDEPENDENCE 
Implications of the 2oo6 Company Law 
Aside from the expanded technical mission foisted on the Chinese courts, the 2006 
changes in the Company Law also signaled potentially significant impacts on the 
autonomy and independence of the judiciary. Specifically, the statute gave courts the 
bases and authority to act in corporate cases with a degree of expertise and autonomy 
far beyond the traditional role of China's Communist-era courts and in disputes 
with significant material interests at stake. The courts will now be asked to apply 
the newly justiciable corporate law in contests between independent commercial 
litigants and other more powerful political-economic actors. Consider, for example, 
a shareholder's lawsuit against a director representing the interests of a state agency-
backed controlling shareholder - or the controlling shareholder itself- for breach 
of corporate fiduciary duties or minority shareholder oppression. Here the judiciary 
will be called upon to protect legal norms against the heretofore superior power of 
9 Luo Peixin, "Judicial Plights in the Context of the New Company Law of China," in Asian Law 
Institute ed., The Development of Law in Asia: Convergence Versus Divergence (Shanghai: Collected 
Papers from the 3rd Asian Law Institute Conference: May 25-26, 2006). 
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the government (or party controlling it) -which power comprises administrative 
and fiscal domination of the courts hearing the case. The question is whether PRC 
courts can take up, or be permitted to take up, this provocative challenge. 
Competence, Autonomy, and Independence Differentiated 
The proposed effects of the 2006 Company Law require definition of three distinct 
concepts invoked here: competence, autonomy, and independence. Competence is 
the easiest to describe and goes to the technical expertise of judicial institutions in 
evaluating factually and legally complex disputes. 10 More important in this volume 
are the seemingly synonymous concepts of judicial autonomy and independence. 
Autonomy is the ability of courts to act with their own institutional authority, even 
when on occasion they have no legal basis to act. An example is where Chinese 
courts accept, hear, and decide cases involving fiduciary duties, veil-piercing, peti-
tions for dissolution, etc., without authority under statute or judicial regulations. 
Judicial independence is still another idea and goes to the ability of courts to act 
independently of, and against the interests of, political and military power. For exam-
ple, a Chinese court might act autonomously to pierce the corporate veil and assess 
direct liability against the controlling shareholder of a debtor firm and yet prove 
The findings on competence are positive, as the Shanghai courts evidence increasing skill in adjudi-
cating corporate matters (with the occasional blunder). Sometimes that skill is demonstrated by judges 
choosing not to apply the law for corporations to what are really closely held corporate partnerships 
(instead intelligently applying partnership law principles) or adeptly handling business forms "left 
over from history" and firms formed spontaneously by entrepreneurs with no basis in any law. The 
study shows there is no connection between the relative level of a given court and its demonstrated 
competence, as the most expert adjudication in corporate matters is often performed by district courts 
far from the more sophisticated action in downtown Shanghai or the exalted premises of the High 
Court. This indicates that the education, intellect, and personal qualities of judicial personnel are 
important variables in determining competence and that the court system's higher reaches may be 
staffed by bureaucratically adept administrative cadres rather than expert lawyers. The data also show 
that there arc significant numbers of corporate law cases where the courts have no opportunity to 
demonstrate competence, or lack of it, because case complexity is so daunting. For instance, the 
Chief Judge of the No.2 Civil Division of the Shanghai High Court reported at the end of 2oo8 that 
the Shanghai courts have been cautious in accepting shareholder/creditor petitions for dissolution, 
even though the 2006 Company Law provides a clear legal basis for such suits, and the Second 
Supreme People's Court Regulations on the Company Law were issued specifically to provide the 
principles of application. The same official also expressed the need for a higher level of expertise 
in handling liquidation matters, especially where creditors are involved and firm principals have 
moved on, and the need to involve other departments such as the State Administration of Industry 
and Commerce (the registration authority), the State Taxation Administration, the banking regulator, 
etc. A related competence problem identified by the Chief Judge is the mandatory prior mediation 
requirement in dissolution actions. The Shanghai courts see this as something they are ill-qualified 
to undertake in a situation where they lack sufficient information, and a waste of judicial resources 
with movement to the inevitable lawsuit. The same phenomenon is reported with respect to the use 
of judicial resources in mandatory pretrial mediation in labor disputes. See "Zhongguo zui mang de 
fating" [China's busiest court}, Nanfang zhoumo, Dec. 4, 2oo8 ("China's Busiest Court"). 
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unable to act independently in enforcing that liability if the controlling shareholder 
is a powerful instrument of the state, party, or military. 
Two other aspects of judicial practice in corporate cases provide a window into 
the degree of judicial independence manifested by Shanghai courts. First, there is 
a way courts act without independence when they implement state or party policy 
in contravention of what the law provides. In discussions of judicial independence 
in China, this failure is often exemplified by the application of criminal law in 
the service of social-political control and without regard to the rights of criminal 
defendants. Many would understand the 1983 Strike Hard campaign or the initial 
stages of the crackdown on Falun Gong as embodiments of this kind of failure." Yet, 
as demonstrated below, even in the context of corporate law application, Chinese 
courts may be seen acting in the service of state or party policy and in contravention 
of the law. Second, and on the side of affirming judicial independence, court 
support for market and/or market-actor autonomy (including self-ordering) over the 
mandates of the state may express a kind of judicial independence. To the extent the 
judiciary has a role in applying such notions in modern China, it can be understood 
as a bulwark against an economic and financial system overwhelmingly dominated 
by the state and party as owner, manager, and regulator. 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Determining Political Background 
As noted, my broader study focuses on the degree of competence and autonomy 
demonstrated in Shanghai corporate law adjudications. This focus is occasioned 
by the lack of transparency about the political power of litigants involved in the 
reported cases. The inability to obtain information about the political background 
of cases makes it exceedingly difficult to evaluate the demonstrated independence 
of judicial bodies in handling corporate law-related civil or criminal matters. The 
task is made doubly difficult because (i) many cases are simply not accepted due to 
public or internal bureaucratic direction or precisely because of the case's political 
coloration, or (ii) even if initially accepted, such cases are not subject to adjudication 
(or not reported as such) again for fear of bumping up against extralegal power. 12 
Thus, it may be assumed that the most politically sensitive cases never make it into 
the body of data analyzed. 
11 As Peerenboom has shown, the campaign against Falun Gong was at least partially "legalized" 
subsequently. Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 91-102. 
12 The author, when a practicing lawyer, remembers representing a European bank in the mid-1990s 
against a large Shanghai financial institution where all levels of the Shanghai court system proved 
unable to act decisively or issue a final judgment for fear of ml ing against the municipal government, 
which controlled the defendant. 
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There are two other reasons for the lack of identifiably political cases m the 
corporate sphere. First, many of the most politically powerful firms are still organized 
as state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"), or wholly state-owned company limited liability 
companies under the Company Law, and so they do not have shareholders or any 
separation of ownership and management. There are thus no shareholders to sue on 
governance concerns, or against corporate insiders, and most disputes are addressed 
between government departments in a wholly political forum. Second, only those 
SOEs that have been corporatized and then engaged in public capital-raising will 
conjure up a group of potential shareholder plaintiffs. Yet, as described more fully 
below, cases with respect to companies limited by shares with a public float are 
largely kept out of the courts by fiat or voluntary denial. As such, corporate lawsuits 
involving state- or party-backed firms, even corporatized, are almost nonexistent 
(although the picture is richer in securities law actions). 
Intimations of Judicial Independence 
Even with this limited ability to discern the political background of corporate cases, 
there is evidence of Shanghai courts ruling against political actors - cases where 
private litigants do battle against both government departments'3 and SOEs or appar-
ently commercial actors/investors with substantial political backing. In fact, in all 
of the more than 200 full opinions reviewed, where there is a discernable political 
interest, the Shanghai courts supported the nonstate/party interest. 
This conclusion is illustrated by two examples, which, perhaps not surprisingly, 
are contract cases implicating state investment vehicles. In 2003, a district-level 
court enforced the rights of an industrial site occupier against a condemning local 
government agency because the relocation contract at issue was validly formed under 
law, and the rights arising thereunder were "to receive the protection of the law" 
(i.e., against the government).'4 The defendant government agency's unsuccessful 
defense against payment of compensation under the contract went directly to state 
power: it asserted execution of the contract "on behalf of the district government" and 
that it had failed to perform pursuant to the "instructions of higher [administrative] 
levels." The court nonetheless ruled for the plaintiff against the government. 
Similarly, a 2007 veil-piercing case went against the interests of a large central state 
entity, albeit in the more expected circumstance of a ruling against a non-Shanghai 
government power.'5 There, a Renminbi ("RMB") 32 million yuan creditor pierced 
1
' And distinct from administrative claims under the Administrative Litigation Law. 
1
4 Shanghai Kangpais Enterprise General Company v. Shanghai Municipal Administration of Industry 
and Commerce Huangpu District Branch, Shanghai Pushun Shunzhe Development Company and 
Shanghai Huangpu Market Development General Company (Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People's 
Court, 2001, upheld by the Shanghai High Court, 2003). 
11 Shanghai Huaxin Electric Wire and Cable Company v. China Tietong Group Company (Shanghai 
No.2 Intermediate People's Court (No.4 Civil Division), 2007, upheld by the Shanghai High Court, 
2007). 
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to the Beijing-based SOE parent of an undercapitalized Shanghai limited liability 
company debtor, with the Shanghai High Court specifically upholding the asser-
tion of parent liability by litigation (i.e., by ex post application of standards by the 
judiciary) based upon "abuse of the corporate form" under Article 20 of the 2006 
Company Law. 
Shanghai courts have also proven able to grapple with the fraught circumstance 
resulting from SOEs existing alongside SOE-invested corporate vehicles and inde-
pendently financed and nonstate corporations. Thus, the courts seem empowered 
to disregard formal corporate structures when they are offered as a defense against 
state or party cadre misfeasance. One 2007 case shows the trial-level court and the 
Shanghai High Court dismissing a first defense seeking to distinguish SOE-subsidiary 
enterprise department actions from the interests of the SOE itself, and then a second 
defense that seeks to protect a corrupt cadre from prosecution because he has diverted 
funds to a (commercial) limited liability company promoted and controlled by him.'6 
A similar case from 2007 dismissed the defendant's pleadings that admitted cor-
porate misfeasance and breach of corporate law and regulation in respect of an 
SOE, but posited that such actions have nothing to do with the crime of "private 
misappropriation of public assets" because they occurred with respect to the internal 
affairs of a corporate entity (albeit a registered SOE).'7 The court would have none 
of this theory and sentenced the defendant to prison and disgorgement of diverted 
income.'8 
As noted previously, another indication of judicial independence in the corporate 
sphere is the ability of the courts to protect some area of semi-autonomous activity 
against direct state regulation. In the many opinions reviewed, there is abundant 
rhetoric upholding market actor autonomy against the state and frequent invocation 
of private ordering in opposition to mandatory business regulation. A statement to this 
effect appears in one intermediate court's 2007 commentary on a 2003 case,'9 where 
the court had to choose between protection of statutory rights of first refusal due 
existing shareholders and the rights of a good faith transferee under a fraudulently 
approved transfer agreement: 
First and foremost, the thing we must clarifY is this: the jurisprudential logic under-
lying the giving of priority to the [right of first refusal] over the purchase rights 
of the transferee is absolutely not because the former right is in statute, and the 
16 PRC v. Xue Henghe (Shanghai Rail Transport Intermediate People's Court, upheld by Shanghai High 
Court, 2007). 
1
7 PRC v. Wang Haiqing eta/. (Shanghai Hongkou District People's Court, 2007). 
18 This is consistent with the same sensitivity and approach taken in a 2001 criminal case, where the 
establishment of a new, private, enterprise (by an SOE manager) designed to skim transfer value from 
the SOE's sourcing transactions is a violation of the Criminal Law's prohibition against "illegally 
engaging in the same business" (as an SOE where the criminal defendant is posted), see PRC v. Shen 
XY (Shanghai High Court, 2001). 
19 A. Investment Development Company v. Wang and Other Shareholders (Shanghai No.1 Intermediate 
People's Court, on appeal, 2003). 
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latter is merely a contract right. This is because statutory rights are not always supe-
rior to contract rights - in fact, it is just the opposite. Approaching it systemically 
and adhering to the orientation which protects private ordering, regulation of the 
market requires that application of the law fully respect the freedom to contract to 
encourage successful transactions .... There is significant meaning in this. 20 
This is a remarkable rhetorical position in the context of recent Chinese history 
and a departme from common views of Chinese law even through the 1990S.21 And 
the position is more than rhetoric, as seen in many Shanghai corporate cases. One 
2005 opinion provides an excellent example where self-ordering memorialized in 
the articles of association completely swallows statutory norms like the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty.22 A 2006 opinion shows the extraordinary weight placed on partnership 
agreement-like articles of association as an expression of private ordering, which 
triumph over larger default provisions or doctrines contained in the Company Law 
itse)f.23 Even with identification of fiduciary duties breach and fraud by a control-
ling shareholder, resolutions passed by a dissident shareholders' meeting are ruled 
invalid because the meeting was not called, and the voting was not effected, in 
technical conformity with the articles of association. The same heavy privileging 
of apparent self-ordering expressed in articles of association and entity regulations 
approved by the board is seen in another case that completely disenfranchised a 
shareholder 24 and a separate 2007--oS opinion where the intermediate court stated 
"the courts should not use the coercive power of the state to interfere with matters 
within the scope of a company's self-governance."2 5 Although this weighting of pri-
vate ordering over statutory mandates does not constitute the sharpest expression 
Shanghai High Courted., 2005 nian Shanghai fayuan anli jingxuan [2005 Selection of Shanghai 
Comt Cases], (Beijing: People's Court Publishing House, 2007), p. 1!1. 
21 Or nineteenth-century reform officials, see Wellington K.K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Mod-
em Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 67-68 (two 
basic premises inherent in the views of officials and literati regarding commerce and industry were 
"that the state had the right to run, or at least intervene in, the affairs of any major business enterprise, 
and that the state had prior prerogatives over its profits ... "). 
" Shanghai Yingdafang Service Company v. Shanghai Yingdafang Zhangjiang Service Company et al. 
(Shanghai Pudong New District People's Com! and Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, 
2005)-
'l Yu Xiaoqi and 18 Shareholders v. Shanghai Changxin Accountancy Limited and Guo Hongtao (Shang-
hai Changning District People's Court and Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, 2oo6). 
24 Shanghai Shenmao Dianci Factory v. Wang Longbao, Shanghai Shengmao Xiancai Company, Shang-
hai Guanlong Electrical Machinery Assembly Company and Taicang Municipal Guanlong Dianci 
Company (Shanghai Nanhui District People's Court, 2004, upheld Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate 
People's Court (No. 3 Civil Division), 2004, overturned Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People's Court 
(No. 3 Civil Division) 2oo6 on rehearing). In this case, the defendant actually pleads that assertion of 
law over the agreement memorialized in board regulations and the articles of association amounts to 
state interference. 
zs Sun X. v. Li Y. and Shi Z. (initial court hearing case and intermediate court hearing appeal not 
identified, but latter probably Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People's Court (No. 3 Civil Division)), 
2007 or 2oo8). 
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of political independence, in the context of China's historical political development 
and its reform-era legal construction program it shows a decidedly independent 
orientation at the courts. 
In another demonstration of judicial independence, there are indications of the 
Shanghai courts acting as the guardians of a new corporate-commercial space. One 
April2oo6 opinion considering the new Article 183 judicial dissolution mechanism 
refuses to grant relief to shareholder plaintiffs and yet directly scolds the directors of 
the subject firm for their failure to comprehend they are not political cadres operating 
a collective but rather shareholders with an economic interest- or corporate directors 
acting as fiduciaries of the owners - who have a radically different relationship to 
their coshareholders (the former worker-participants in the collective): 
But, the court has also noticed that the three defendants, as directors of the com-
pany, have not really made the transition from their former role as leader-cadres 
of a collectively-owned enterprise to that of shareholders in a limited liability com-
pany. For instance, in calling shareholders' meetings they have not conformed to 
their notification obligations, have failed in bringing about discussion of corporate 
operating policies, and ignored the other related rights of the seven plaintiffs. In 
addition, in managing corporate finances, there seems to be in evidence action 
which includes the transfer of corporate funds into personal accounts and the hold-
ing out of corporate automotive vehicles as personal assets. And, the expenditures 
by the company have not been handled transparently, etc. The above-described 
actions by the defendants have certainly brought about the lack of trust by the 
plaintiffs, which has resulted in the disagreement [between shareholders ].26 
This opinion shows a PRC court striving to remind participants in an altered 
economic-corporate law system that the new order entails real separation of enter-
prise and administration, which the same judicial institutions seek to protect and 
enforce. Insofar as it works directly against the interests of preferred political actors, 
it is also an expression of judicial independence. 
Failures to Demonstrate Judicial Independence 
There are several ways in which the Shanghai courts evidence serious independence 
limitations in the sense proposed above, most notably ( i) by acting as the handmaiden 
of policy implementation in contravention of what the Company Law allows or 
directs, and (ii) by blanket rejection of public company/large plaintiff cases. 
First, the 1992-2008 survey shows a large number of cases- and in every instance 
of shareholder petition for judicial dissolution - where the courts actually work 
against the law in the service of state policy aims. A 2006 judicial dissolution case27 
is indicative of this value choice cum doctrinal approach. It is the same approach 
26 Yang Lizhi et al. v. Cao Zhengjie eta/. (Xuhui District People's Court, 2oo6). 
27 Tang Chunshao v. Zhou Huizhong (Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People's Court, zoo6). 
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adopted two years later in the Second Supreme People's Court Regulations on 
the 2006 Company Law,'8 articulated directly by the Chief Judge of the Shanghai 
High Court No. 2 Civil Division in December 2008 when discussing the courts' 
hesitancy in accepting and allowing dissolution-liquidation pleadings,'9 and the 
policy direction signaled in a December 2008 ten-point notice distributed by one 
Shanghai intermediate court. The case involves Article 183 of the new Company 
Law, where the court rejects plaintiffs suit for judicial dissolution of a thoroughly 
deadlocked company. In the expanded reasoning behind the simple judgment, the 
court declares it is loath to order dissolution of a corporate legal person - even 
a dysfunctional one - because such action would "necessarily impact in different 
degrees on market order and stability." 
Another 2oo6 case, where shareholders of a limited liability company (transformed 
from a collectively owned enterprise) also sought judicial dissolution, evidences 
much the same approach by the Xuhui District court.3° There the application for 
dissolution is also refused because it is seen as a drastic and disruptive remedy, and-
perhaps most importantly - it would alter arrangements whereby salary was being 
paid to laid-off workers. The Shanghai High Court in a commentary lauded the 
court's refusal to grant dissolution relief because of the negative impacts on market 
stability and the attendant social costs. 
The consistent approach in these cases may be contrasted with an economic 
approach that encourages efficient redeployment of capital when shareholder rela-
tions become so difficult that they make firm operations impossible)' Instead, what 
these case opinions evidence is the courts acting as administrative units - often 
directly in conformity with bureaucratic instruction - prioritizing national social 
and economic policy over and above more specific mandates (and rights) set forth 
in the Company Law. 
Far more illustrative of potential limitations on judicial independence is the 
pronounced absence in the sample of case opinions having anything to do with 
' 8 Article 5, which for petitions under Article 183 directs the courts to emphasize mediation and then 
strongly pushes the courts to support an agreed buyout among the shareholders, reduction of capital, 
and exit of one or more partners, or any method which is not in contravention of a mandatory 
article of law or administrative regulation, to serve the overriding priority of maintaining entity 
existence. 
'9 "We strive to keep the company in existence; we have to think about creditors, the social responsibility 
of the corporate person, and the fate of the employees." 
3o Yang Lizhi et al. v. Cao Zhengjie et al. (Xuhui District People's Court, 2006). 
l' Compare Shanghai Jingfa Enterprise Development Company v. Shanghai Haining Petroleum Prod-
ucts Company (Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's Court, upheld on appeal at the Shanghai 
High Court, 2003) where the put of equity interests owned by complaining shareholders to the other 
(breaching) shareholders is ordered to allow the company to continue normal operations and main-
tain employment of the company's accumulated value but also implicitly to allow the complaining 
shareholders to redeploy their capital to continuing productive uses. In this case, the rhetoric about 
market stability and continued use of productive assets is similar, but the court feels emboldened to 
fashion its own, implicitly, economically far more efficient, remedy. 
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companies limited by shares (joint stock companies)32 or such companies with listed 
capital, or their shareholders- less than 1 percent of the case opinions reviewed in 
detail between 1992 and 2008." One result of this apparent rejection of public cases 
is that whole swaths of the Company Law are simply not used, 34 including numerous 
provisions supporting basic claims one expects to see in the application of a company 
statute in a country with two active stock exchanges. 35 
Does this mean that companies limited by shares and their shareholders and 
directors and officers (and controlling shareholders) are not getting into trouble 
or arc being operated without discord and in perfect conformity with the highest 
standards of modern corporate governance? Absolutely not, as divined from the 
daily reports in China's muckraking financial press of corporate governance sins too 
manifold to mention. 
When considering why so few such cases appear in the Shanghai courts- which is 
after all the situs of the Shanghai Stock Exchange- there are a number of reasons that 
have little to do with judicial independence concerns. One explanation -focusing 
on the plaintiff, not court bureaucracy, side- is a substitute enforcement structure 
l' It appears that Shanghai courts have had no particular problem dealing with the limited liability com-
pany form that actually predated China's entire corporate law system, the foreign-invested enterprise 
("FIE") forms dominated by Chinese-foreign equity and cooperative joint ventures, each of which 
have their own specific statute and/or regulations governing certain aspects ofthcir legal identity, oper-
ations, and shareholder relations. One of the reasons FIE-related cases are not seen in the Shanghai 
courts is that foreign investors and their PRC partners almost uniformly choose exclusive arbitration 
for dispute resolution. 
ll Sec Zhang X and Other Shareholders of Shanghai A Company Limited v. Shanghai A Company 
Limited (first and rehearing courts not identified, 1995); Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Industry 
Machinery Company, Limited (Shanghai Jingan District People's Court, Shanghai No.2 Intermediate 
People's Court, 2006); and PRC v. Fang Kun, Ni Chunhua and Zhang Mingxia (Shanghai Pudong 
New District Court, upheld by the Shanghai No.1 Intermediate People's Court, 2007). In the 2003 
Shanghai Company Law Opinion, reviewing more than a decade of corporate law cases in Shanghai, 
the only mention of public company cases is the allusion to "suits by public company shareholders to 
invalidate corporate resolutions" in a long list of "continuing difficulties," indicating that the courts 
receive such pleadings but perhaps do not accept them. 
34 For both companies limited by shares (listed or not) and limited liability companies (even the 
close corporation/corporate partnership form so prevalent in China's enterprise reality), the following 
are also absent: shareholders' civil suits against other shareholders for oppression; claims against 
control or actual control parties for harm to the company; specifically pleaded breaches of duty of 
care or duty of loyalty (including funds misappropriation, illegal lending or guarantees, self-dealing, 
corporate opportunity, corporate secrets); specifically pleaded claims against directors, officers, or 
supervisory board members for compensation; specifically pleaded derivative actions; adjudication 
of actual control person status; failure to make financial reports to shareholders; company dividend 
distributions; or breach of duties by court-confirmed liquidation group. Given the politicized capital 
structure of even non public companies in the PRC, this paucity of claims may also be determined by 
political factors and thus have implications for the exercise of judicial independence. 
35 Equally glaring is the omission of any cases involving the new garb given SOEs, the wholly state-
owned company subgenus of limited liability company. The absence of wholly state-owned limited 
liability companies conversely has everything to do with the reality of these firms as administrative 
units wholly controlled by state and party actors (even though reclad under the Company Law), with 
no shareholders' meeting. 
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for listed companies' cases via the public prosecutor36 and the securities regula-
tory authority,37 each prodded by the aggressive financial media in China. Another 
explanation, equally unrelated to judicial independence concerns, is what might be 
called the demand-side theory, where shareholders do not bring actions against the 
companies limited by shares they invest in either because of familiar collective-
action problems or because they themselves do not understand that courts -
as contrasted with the securities regulator - are the appropriate forum for hear-
ing their claims.38 The latter attitude is exemplified in the straight-faced pleadings 
reported in a zooS private action against the CSRC.39 There a defendant director, 
obviously negligent in fulfilling his corporate fiduciary duties, asserted he was not 
one of the named persons with a fiduciary duty under the PRC Securities Law -
thereby completely ignoring the application of the Company Law to his role as 
a director of a public company limited by shares. Flawed in the legal sense, the 
defense highlights a common understanding in China of the separate worlds of 
limited liability companies on one side and companies limited by shares with listed 
stock on the other. 
More likely explanations for the absence of public company cases are that the 
Shanghai courts (i) voluntarily avoid taking such cases, and (ii) are specifically 
directed not to take such cases. The distaste for public company cases, whether 
self-directed or ordered from the higher regions of the judiciary, was exemplified 
in the posture famously taken by the Pudong New District Court when it refused 
to accept the first public shareholders' suit against a capital markets issuer (and 
36 See, for example, the use of criminal law to punish breach of duty of loyalty in the prosecution of 
former New China Life chairman Guan Guo liang, "Yi shen Guan Guoliang" [First hearing for Guan 
Guoliang], Caijing, Dec. 8, 2008. 
37 Only one case sees a Shanghai court diminishing the power of the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission and taking a uniquely activist approach: Lu Jianming v. Shanghai Light Industry Machinery 
Company, Limited (Shanghai Jingan District People's Court, Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's 
Court, 2oo6). 
38 One Shanghai High Court judge told the author that the great proportion of closed company (limited 
liability company) cases and the absence of company limited by share/listed company cases are a 
result of"the relative completeness and clarity of the Company Law in addressing companies limited 
by shares" and because limited liability companies experience recurring problems of shareholder 
oppression and dual shareholder-employee status. This explanation seems dubious, especially as 
there is ample evidence of policy guidance constraining lower level courts from accepting sue h 
cases. 
39 Shenzhen Shenxin Taifeng Co., Ltd., where a fined director brought suit against the CSRC in a 
Beijing intermediate court pleading that he was "only a director appointed by a shareholder, and did 
not really participate in operation and management of the company" and so did not directly manage 
or operate the company, and thus is not one of "the only two kinds of people who can be fined under 
the PRC Securities Law." "Shang shi gongsi dongshi beifa zhuangao zhengjianhui" [Fined listed 
company director sues the CSRC], Xinjing baa, Dec. 7, 2008. See also the "flower vase director" case 
described at Nicholas C. Howson, "The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-American 
Fiduciary Duties in China's 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence" 
in Hideki Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim, and Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., Transfonning Corporate Governance in 
East Asia (Oxford: Routledge, 2oo8), pp. 226-228. 
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its board, officers, and accountants) for false disclosure in 1999.4° As the court 
wrote, "The plaintiff's case regarding behavior in violation of laws and regulations 
in the stock market should be handled by the CSRC. The plaintiff's suit regarding a 
securities dispute does not come within the jurisdiction of this court." More recently, 
evidence of self-restraint comes both from discussions with Supreme People's Court 
and Shanghai court officials between 2oo6 and 2oo8 and similar blanket refusals in 
respect of transferred nonperforming loan collection cases since 2005,4' as well as 
thousands of cases by public stock purchasers seeking remedies for capital markets 
manipulation and fraud between 1999 and 2003. 
There is both documentary and oral evidence suggesting that the Shanghai courts 
have been specifically directed not to accept public company cases. These instruc-
tions can come via openly issued regulations or local-level opinions, such as the 
December 12, 2002, ban on acceptance of securities actions, the January 9, 2003, 
Supreme People's Court regulations forbidding claims on manipulation and insider 
trading, and the June 2003 Shanghai Company Law Opinion command that Shang-
hai courts temporarily not accept shareholders' claims seeking invalidation of reso-
lutions by companies with listed shares.42 These instructions are also communicated 
internally, as noted in late 2oo8 by the president of one of Shanghai's most expert 
district-level courts when alluding to the existence of an internal instruction from 
the Supreme People's Court (not the CSRC) and apparently justified as part of the 
effort to discourage vexatious shareholder litigation nationally.43 
Regardless of the mechanisms the Shanghai courts use to shunt aside public com-
pany cases, rationales supporting the rejectionist stance are fairly well understood 
and relevant to a consideration of judicial independence. One rationale dictates that 
courts be told to decline or voluntarily refuse listed company cases for fear of large 
plaintiff groups, and the attendant perceived threat of social instability or impact 
on the "super-value" in Chinese administrative-political culture: social harmony. 
This is seen in the Shanghai High Court's rejectionist response to group plaintiff 
actions (e.g., shareholders' suits) generally and to shareholders' suits to overturn 
resolutions, force dividend distributions, cause judicially mandated sale of equity, 
or spur dissolution, all at companies limited by shares or companies with publicly 
listed stock. The No. 2 Civil Division of the Shanghai High Court alludes to this 
4° The case against Hongguang Enterprise Co., Limited. See Xu Zhaoxiong and Zheng Hui eds., 
Zhengjuan anli jingjie [Selection and Explanation of Securities Law Cases], (Shanghai: Oriental 
Publishing Center, zom), pp. sS-6+ 
41 See "Buliang daikuan chuzhe xin guiding liang nan" [Two difficulties for new regulation of non-
performing loan arrangements], Caijing, Nov. z4, zooS ("NPL !") and "Buliang daikuan zhuan-
rang susong 'jiedong'" ["The 'unfreezing' of litigation relating to the transfer of non-performing 
loans"], Caijing, Dec. S, zooS, http://caijing.com.cn/zooS-Jz--<J4/noo34693·html (reviewed Dec. zooS) 
("NPL II"). 
42 This instruction was reversed upon adoption of the zoo6 Company Law. 
43 Remarks of the Shanghai Changning District People's Court President, Dec. 5, zooS. 
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apparent redline in its grudging reversal of a pre-2oo6 policy barring lawsuits that 
seek to invalidate public company resolutions: 
In view of the fact that these kinds of cases may give rise to issues related to mass 
litigation and volatility in the securities markets, [the Shanghai courts] have taken an 
especially cautious attitude towards accepting these cases; in accepting these cases, 
we ask that the shareholders provide related evidence showing why the shareholders 
or board resolution is invalid or should be invalidated, and we will examine this 
evidence strictly so as to protect against vexatious shareholder litigation.44 
A second rationale can also be perceived, albeit more subtly, in the Shanghai court 
system's consistent bias in favor of stability (including, as noted above, business entity 
preservation at all costs) over other values that might be held high in corporate law 
application, like transactional efficiency, redeployment of capital to most efficient 
uses, or fairness. Thus, even in the world of corporate law jurisprudence, where law, 
regulation, and fairness (often invoked by the Shanghai courts in corporate law cases) 
should be dispositive, there is a strong concern in the courts for political or social 
order, which either causes them to disregard the power they are clearly authorized 
to wield under the zoo6 Company Law or causes their political and administrative 
masters to limit their jurisdiction in bald contradiction with the scope of their 
statutory power. 
A third, largely unspoken rationale perhaps informing the rejectionist stance 
toward public company cases is twofold: (i) that such firms involve what were state-
owned assets (albeit corporatized and repackaged as listed companies), and (ii) 
that the promoters, controlling shareholders, and directors, officers, and supervi-
sory board members and other insiders are tied to superior political power, whether 
the state, the party, or the military. There is evidence that the courts will avoid 
cases concerning state-owned assets.45 There is no document that describes the lat-
ter, sharper, political sensitivity, and no Shanghai court official approached in the 
course of the study alluded to it other than tangentially in connection with a discus-
sion of the function of political-legal committees. 46 Yet it seems safe to speculate that 
44 Shanghai Company Law Report, p. 44· 
45 For instance, where a 2004 report by the head of the Hubei High Court warning of irregular activity 
and loss of state assets through transfers of non performing loans to asset management companies and 
then to third parties caused the courts to simply stop accepting or ruling on such cases in 2005. See 
NPL I and NPL II. 
46 According to officials at the Shanghai courts, most corporate and commercial case opinions are first 
drafted and then filed (beian) with the political-legal committee. Yet the same officials noted that if 
a specific case is particular (teshu)- potentially impacting on social stability (wending) or conflicting 
powers - the panel actually hearing the case and its court level administration will seek the opinion 
of the political-legal committee before accepting or deciding a case. These same officials declared 
that the notion of conflicting powers does not accommodate political conflict or political-economic 
privilege versus civil society, but instead conflicting jurisdictions (for instance, CSRC regulation 
against application of the corporate law by the courts). 
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the fear of involving far stronger political actors (and court paymasters if the defen-
dants have organized the corporate entity in the same jurisdiction) or attempting 
to enforce against them animates the profound disinterest on the part of the court 
system toward application of the corporate law with respect to these firms. 
The foregoing may explain the paucity of public company cases in the Shanghai 
courts, yet it does not excuse the same phenomenon. That lack of application 
constitutes a tragedy for China's corporate governance reform, precisely because it 
was the dire state of corporate governance at public companies that occasioned the 
2oo6 Company Law amendments and the statute's new justiciability.47 Indeed, one 
question for the future of the Chinese judiciary is the Chinese legal system's ability to 
sustain this defensive posture against mass-plaintiff cases.48 Aside from the urgings of 
reformist intellectuals and lawyers, and despite older studies in 2001 and2002 showing 
litigation adversity among China's urban and rural citizens,49 individuals continue 
to push into the courts en masse. In late 2008, the Shanghai No.1 Intermediate Court 
announced that it alone has seen skyrocketing numbers of group ( qunti) lawsuits 
accepted in the past few years: from twenty-seven group cases suing on the same 
cause of action and1,047 claimants in 2oo6 to fifty such cases (1,671 claimants) in 
2007 and sixty-two such cases (1449 claimants) by October 1, 2008.5° Most of these 
cases pertain to labor disputes, residential housing management, administrative 
condemnation ofland and buildings, and rural contracting. Other data demonstrate 
similar patterns nationally, with large numbers of group suits brought with respect 
to labor rightsY official misfeasance,52 environmental torts, food contamination,53 
securities violations, etc. In response, one intermediate court in the Shanghai system 
+7 Shanghai Stock Exchange ed., Zhongguo gongsi zhili baogao (2003) nian [China Corporate Gover-
nance Report 2003], (Shanghai: Fudan University Publishing Honse, 2003). 
+R See "Huajie minyuan: sifa ying ti zhengzhi huachu 'huanchongdai"'' [Assuaging popular anger: the 
judiciary should be a 'conflict resolution area' substitute], Nanfang zhoumo, Nov. 13, 2008, and "Qunti 
peichang: quan yi yli yang an" [Mass compensation: rights and stability], Caiiing, Oct. 13, 2oo8 (both 
doubting the long-term political sustainability of the cnrrent situation, even if justified at present by 
overburdened judicial resources). 
49 "Celiang shehui de hexie chengclu" [Measuring the degree of harmony in societyj, Nanfang zhoumou, 
Nov. 20, 2oo8. 
5o A doubling of cases in just twenty-four months, with no data on cases of the same type refused. 
"Shanghai shi eli yi zhongyuan tansuo shenpan xin jucuo" [Shanghai Municipal No.1 Intermediate 
People's Court explores new adjudication measures], Xinmin wanbao, Nov. 4, 2oo8 ("New Adjudica-
tion Measures"). 
5' One report in late 2008 shows how overburdened a very local-level court in Guangdong Province is. 
To November 15, 2oo8, a basic level court serving a subdistrict ofDongguan with only thirteen judges 
had to process 7,540 cases (mostly labor contract cases and disputes regarding laid-off workers), against 
a national average of forty-two cases/judge. That case acceptance and adjudication rate was already a 
wo percent increase over the count for the same district in all of 2007. See China's Busiest Court. 
52 "Parents of schoolchilclren killed in China quake confirm lawsuit," The New York Times, Dec. 23, 
2008. 
53 See "Milk scandal in China yields cash for parents," The New York Times, Jan. 17, 2009, and "Class 
action suit, rare in China, is filed over tainted milk," The New York Times, Jan. 21, 2009. 
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has now developed special procedures to handle such cases. The procedures are 
designed to provide an early warning system to the entire Shanghai court system of 
approaching group lawsuits.54 
JUDICIAL AUTONOMY 
This chapter cannot present in detail the study's findings on the demonstrated degree 
of institutional autonomy in Shanghai corporate law cases from 199z to zooS. In 
summary, the Shanghai courts showed increasing autonomy after the promulgation 
of the 1994 Company Law and through the end of zoo5. This is shown by the 
acceptance of cases in areas and the fashioning of remedies without authorization 
under statute or judicial regulations. Immediately after the zoo6 Company Law took 
effect, there was a notably aggressive invocation of the new statute, even with respect 
to claims arising prior to January 1, zoo6.55 However, in the years following zoo6, 
there has been an authorization-constraint dynamic at work where the Shanghai 
courts draw back from acceptance and adjudication of cases they are now explicitly 
authorized to hear and did hear when they were not authorized to. 
Important in any institutional autonomy discussion are the bureaucratic instruc-
tions liberally issued in the PRC court system. First are judicial regulations issued 
by the Supreme People's Court- often incorrectly called judicial "explanations"-
that provide a procedural and substantive basis for claims rooted in explicit statutory 
provisions.56 Second are local-level opinions like the Shanghai High Court opinion 
on the handling of corporate law cases distributed internally in June zoo3. Third are 
occasional notices and opinions issued by individual court systems, some publicly, 
others internally. For example, during the accelerating financial crisis in late zooS, 
54 New Adjudication Measures. 
55 In the Shanghai High Court study of 2006 corporate law adjudications, of the 318 cases producing a 
judgment after a first hearing, 164 (52 percent) used the new Company Law in the judgment; of those 
164 cases, 102 cases ( 62 percent) issued a final judgment based on the 2006 statute, whereas 62 cases 
(38 percent) issued judgments using the preamendment 1994 version. This result is noteworthy because 
fully 88 percent of this litigation arose from circumstances prior to January 1, 2006. It indicates that 
the Shanghai courts felt free to implement the new 2006 Company Law on claims arising when the 
governing statute lacked affirmative legal bases for such claims. The Shanghai High Court is explicit 
about this when it coyly points to several cases where it applied expanded legal rights bestowed in the 
new Company Law, even though the case arose from a time when only the much narrower rights 
granted in the 1994law were available. (See Shanghai Company Law Report.) 
56 The Supreme People's Court issues three kinds of explanatory documents with something like the 
power oflaw or regulation: explanations (jieshi), regulations (guiding), and approving responses (pifu). 
Explanations by the court elaborate "law" (fa); regulations are issued to provide judicial institutions 
with direction on how to apply "law" to certain kinds of cases or common problems; and approving 
responses are Supreme People's Court responses to queries regarding correct application of"law" by 
Provincial High Courts and People's Liberation Army courts. To date, the Supreme People's Court 
has issued two regulations on the 2006 Company Law, the first on how courts should handle actions 
that straddle January 1, 2006, and the second on shareholder petitions for company dissolution. A 
third, on the derivative action mechanism, is expected in 2009. 
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when many of China's export-oriented producers in the Yangtze River Delta area 
experienced difficulties, the Shanghai High Court publicly issued an eleven-point 
document calling for heightened sensitivity to the impact of case decisions on dis-
tressed industries, reduction or elimination of litigation fees, deposit exemptions, 
and an emphasis on speedy adjudication of labor rights and compensation cases 
and enforcement. On December 2, 2008, one Shanghai intermediate court even 
issued its own ten-point document explaining how it would conform to the pol-
icy commands enunciated by the High Court, whose measures included unified 
and accelerated financial crisis-related case acceptance, hearing and enforcement, 
sensitivity to the capacity of firms to bear enforcement actions or asset attachment, 
and attention to the highest value of all noted above in the discussion of judicial 
independence: finding a way for distressed enterprises to keep operating even if 
technically insolvent or in default.57 
Supreme People's Court regulations can impact the application of a "law" (fa) 
in three important ways: (i) providing specific authorization for claims already 
described in principle in statute;58 (ii) forbidding the acceptance of certain claims;59 
and (iii) providing new legal bases for adjudication beyond what is set forth in 
statute. For instance, the May 2oo8 regulations on application of the 2oo6 Company 
Law forbid the acceptance of shareholder petitions for dissolution of companies 
based on factors not explicitly included in Article 183; yet the same regulations pro-
vide for expanded justiciability of claims beyond what is permitted in the statute.60 
Regulations can also prod courts to restart adjudication on cases they have vol-
untarily refused to accept.61 Local-level instructions like the 2003 Shanghai opin-
ion on corporate law cases show how local court bureaucracies may not wait for 
57 See "Jinrong weiji anjian youle kuaishen tongdao" [Financial crisis cases have an accelerated hearing 
channel], Dongfang zaobao, Dec. 3, zooS. 
;H As in the January 9, 2003, Supreme People's Court regulations allowing private lawsuits against false 
or misleading disclosure in the securities markets. 
~~ As in the January 15, zooz, Supreme People's Court regulations mandating rejection of private share-
holders' suits on securities law claims. 
r,o Expanded justiciability with respect to creditors' lawsuits seeking confirmation of debts owed by the 
company subject to dissolution, and creditors' claims for joint and several liability for shareholders 
and controlling shareholders arising from their misfeasance or manipulation of residual assets in the 
dissolution and liquidation process. Another example is the 2003 draft regulation on Company Law 
adjudication issued before enactment of the zoo6 Company I .aw, which regulation provided the basis 
for mechanisms absent from the 1994 Company Law, including: corporate veil piercing, derivative 
actions, shareholders' information rights, fiduciary duties, liquidation procedures, shareholders' law-
suits for invalidation of resolutions, etc. If the Company Law had not been amended in zoo6 to include 
these items, and the draft had been actually issued as Supreme People's Court regulation, then the 
regulations would have provided the basis for a whole host of claims and procedures going far beyond 
the spare legal bases explicitly set forth in the 1994law. 
6' A good current example of this kind of regulation is the continuing effort to issue a document 
instructing the courts to recommence handling creditors' collection actions on nonperforming loans 
sold by commercial banks to asset management companies and then to third-party buyers. See NPL I 
and NPL II. 
Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts 151 
central approval before adjudicating claims not explicitly justiciable and similarly 
will not wait for regulations even on newly justiciable items. For example, in the 
2003 Shanghai Company Law Opinion, there are detailed provisions on judicial veil-
piercing, disregard of the corporate form, and derivative actions - none of which 
had any legal basis under the 1994 Company Law, Supreme People's Court regula-
tion, or in statute until the adoption of the 2006 Company Law. At the same time, 
the Shanghai Opinion also eliminated consideration of certain claims that courts 
were not authorized in statute to examine.62 One Shanghai High Court official 
acknowledged to the author that the Shanghai court system indeed issues its own 
explanations- sometimes openly, usually internally. The official acknowledged that 
although such documents are normatively not as authoritative as Supreme Peo-
ple's Court regulations, in reality they can be more powerful in the handling of 
actual cases at the noncentrallevel.63 The same judge also admitted that these local 
explanations are often issued before central bureaucracy instructions and thus gain 
authority by the mere fact of being in existence long before the national authori-
ties get around to issuing a well-vetted regulation for the guidance of lower level 
courts. 
There continues to be a fierce dispute in China on the real effect of judicial 
regulations. In the most common view emanating from the Chinese courts and 
academic circles, Supreme People's Court regulations are a condition precedent to 
application of certain provisions of law or doctrine by courts. For instance, many 
Chinese academics, lawyers, and judges hold that important provisions of the 2006 
Company Law - such as corporate fiduciary duties, veil-piercing, or the deriva-
tive lawsuit mechanism - simply cannot be applied until regulations specifically 
addressing use of the provision have been issued. This broadly accepted notion is 
an important block in many other areas of Chinese law, for instance with regard 
to the use and application of the new PRC Bankruptcy Law,64 with the Chinese 
courts openly refusing to accept bankruptcy cases without a judicial regulation. Yet 
even the shallowest inquiry, the many cases reviewed in the period 1992-2008 for 
Shanghai,65 and the rich body of subnationallevel court opinions available demon-
strate that this perception is not vindicated in the reality of lower-level adjudication 
and that the courts habitually accept and adjudicate cases relating to claims and 
mechanisms they have no authority to hear. 
That being the case, it makes the negative authorization-constraint dynamic in 
the Shanghai courts after 2oo6 all the more striking. That dynamic is the situation 
where courts do not apply doctrines specifically authorized in the 2006 Company 
62 For instance, the Shanghai Company Law Opinion's temporary prohibition against accepting corpo-
rate resolution invalidation claims for public companies. 
63 Shanghai High Court judge, October 2008. 
64 See http://chinacourt.org/html!articlehoo7o7/nhs6o34-Shtml (reviewed Dec. 2oo8). 
65 And see Howson, The Doctrine That Dared Not Speak Its Name (early adjudication of corporate 
fiduciary duties claims and allowance of derivative suits). 
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Law after January 1, 2006, even though they freely employed them before when there 
was no legal basis for them.66 
Speculation on the reasons behind this counterintuitive reaction by the Shanghai 
courts is difficult. The purported civil law affiliation of the Chinese legal system 
is not helpful, precisely because Shanghai judges have demonstrated their auton-
omy in hearing claims without a formal statutory basis (or reference to academic 
or superior authorities) while even evidencing a common-law equity courts style of 
law application. Of course the courts may refuse to accept such cases or use such 
now-authorized doctrines because of some opaque political sensitivity- either by 
virtue of the parties involved or the ever-present risk of brushing up against state assets 
(as in the simple contract law nonperforming loan collection cases blocked since 
2005). A more benign explanation may be the (temporary) reassertion of the Chinese 
court's basic bureaucratic identity. Before the 2006 authorization of key doctrines, 
courts may have felt relatively free to range about and implement common sense or 
justice- (fairness)-oriented solutions such as invocation of corporate fiduciary duties 
against obviously opportunistic or inattentive directors or ad hoc permission of a 
derivative suit even if not pleaded. With some of these doctrines now included 
in formal "law," even if in principle, the courts as embedded bureaucratic actors 
wait to see how the apex of their bureaucracy system (the Supreme People's Court) 
will instruct implementation of these newly declared instruments. This view is not 
wholly satisfactory, however, as some Shanghai courts continue to implement new 
corporate law doctrine and remedies without regulations or superior direction (for 
instance, in adjudicating fiduciary standards, permitting derivative lawsuits, and 
veil-piercing). This explanation goes some way to describing the basis for the pro-
nounced reversal in one kind of autonomy after 2oo6 and also reminds us of the 
origins and context of party-directed, bureaucratically embedded actors lacking 
the fuller freedom of more autonomous judicial institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
In North-Weberian terms,67 China is still far from the complete rule of law state 
with seamless protection of property rights and expectations. Yet the corporatization 
program- and the implementation of a justiciable corporate law calling for ex post 
66 Space limitations make it impossible to detail the cases, pre- and post-zoo6, that show this. Aside from 
the cases reviewed for this study and information related by Shanghai judicial officials, the dynamic 
is noted in the remarks of professor Zhu Ciyun, Tsinghua Law School, at the East China University 
of Politics and Law in November zooS (citing an internal Supreme People's Court study showing 
that the courts have shied away from accepting veil-piercing and derivative lawsuits even after such 
mechanisms were formally established in the zoo6 Company Law). 
67 See "Self-Government, Law and Capitalism" in Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and 
Taoism (1922), pp. 84-104 (Hans H. Gerth, trans., 1964); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance (1990); and Donald C. Clarke, "Economic Development and the 
Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem," American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 58, p. 89 (2003). 
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application oflaw by a judiciary- has spurred the nation's formal legal institutions 
to develop real competence, substantial autonomy, and hints of political indepen-
dence in application of one kind oflaw so important for growth. Those developments 
and the expectation of future progress in the same direction have clearly provided 
the initial assurances necessary for growth-enhancing investment and participation 
in China's capital markets. The critical question remains whether, in the techni-
cally complex world of corporate law adjudication, Chinese courts must achieve 
even greater judicial autonomy and independence to assure continued economic 
growth and hoped-for social stability, not to mention the equally important effect of 
enhanced institutional legitimacy for the judiciary itself. 
